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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Donald Rossignol, Jr., appeals from his convictions for lewd conduct with
a minor under sixteen years of age and sexual abuse of a child.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
S.R. went to live with her father, Rossignol, after her mother died in a car
accident. (Tr., p.793, L.15 - p.794, L.3.) S.R. was seven years old and in the
second grade when she moved in with her father. (Tr., p.794, Ls.11-13.) S.R.
was a participant in the "Bear Buddy" program -- a mentoring program for
children at Lena Whitman Elementary School in Moscow, Idaho.

(Tr., p.982,

L.18 - p.983, L.17.) Clara Hill was assigned as S.R.'s mentor. When S.R.'s
father, Rossignol, decided to take S.R. out of the program, Ms. Hill met with S.R.
to tell her goodbye. (Tr., p.987, L.15 - p.991, L.19.)
At that meeting Ms. Hill asked S.R. if her father had told her that she
would no longer participate in the program. (Tr., p.991, Ls.4-18.) S.R. said he
had but that she could not discuss it because it was about the "secret." (Tr.,
p.991, Ls.15-18.)

Ms. Hill encouraged S.R. to tell her about the secret if it

involved the Bear Buddy program. (Tr., p.991, Ls.21-24.) S.R. said she would if
Ms. Hill promised not to tell anyone. (Tr., p.991, L.21 - p.992, L.16.) Ms. Hill said
she could not promise not to tell some secrets, but it would be a good idea if she
told her. (Tr., p.992, Ls.5-8.) S.R. had Ms. Hill move her to another more private
room and where S.R. started whispering. (Tr., p.992, L.10 - p.993, L.2.) S.R.
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then disclosed that she was being sexually abused by her father. (Tr., p.993, L.1
- p.995, L.2.)
Specifically, S.R. told Ms. Hill that her father was teaching her about
massaging but that it was not really massaging and that it was not right. (Tr.,
p.993, Ls.2-8.) When Ms. Hill asked what she meant by that S.R. said her father
massaged her in her "private places" and pointed to her chest and crotch. (Tr.,
p.993, Ls.2-17.)

S.R. asked Ms. Hill if she knew what a boy's private parts

looked like and Ms. Hill said she did. S.R. then said, "well, my Dad makes me
put my mouth on his." (Tr., p.993, Ls.19-25.) S.R. then said, "and there's the
really bad thing too." When asked what she meant, S.R. said that her "father
showed her pictures of men and women having S-E-X." (Tr., p.993, L.25 - p.994,
L.4.)

Following this conversation, Ms. Hill brought S.R. to Betty Heidelberger,
the counselor at the elementary school. (Tr., p.996, Ls.1-9.) S.R. also told Mrs.
Heidelberger that she was being abused by Rossignol (Tr., p.1028, Ls.9-15) and
that she was afraid of being alone with him (Tr., p.1029, Ls.12-14). Following an
additional interview with Detective Margaret Lehmbecker and Investigator
Rhonda Schultz from Health and Welfare, S.R. was removed from the home and
placed in state's custody. (Tr., p.1078, Ls.2-10.)
As part of the investigation, Rossignol's computer was seized. (Tr.,
p.1097, L.1 - p.1098, L.3; p.842, Ls.13-20.) Consistent with S.R.'s disclosures
about her abuse, an analysis of the computer revealed pornographic images.
(Tr., p.852, Ls.15-20.)

In addition to showing that Rossignol had accessed
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pornographic images similar to those sex acts described by his daugher, the
computer also revealed that Rossignol had accessed internet stories of incest.
(Tr., p.877, L.11 - p.878, L.21.)
Rossignol was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child.

(R., pp.80-82.) The

defendant was released on his own recognizance at his initial appearance. (R.,
p.84.) Rossignol was bound over to the district court on the same charges after
a preliminary hearing and after a criminal information was filed. (R., pp.88-90;
106-108.)
During this time, Rossignol was involved in a child protection case
regarding his daughter based on the same underlying facts and allegations as
the criminal action.

(R., pp.158-59.)

Following Rossignol's testimony at an

adjudicatory hearing in the child protective matter, the state filed additional
charges claiming Rossignol had perjured himself at the hearing. (R., pp.158-59.)
In the present case, the criminal action, the state filed a motion to increase bail
because it believed that "the release of the defendant on his own recognizance
[was] inadequate to insure the defendant's future appearance." (R., p.159.)
Rossignol was ordered to appear on the motion. (R., p.219.) Rossignol
failed to appear and his release on his own recognizance was revoked. (R., p.
292.) The jury trial date was vacated and the court issued a bench warrant. Two
months later, Rossignol turned himself into authorities. (R., p.369.) The jury trial
was rescheduled (R., p.369) and the state moved to amend the information to
include a persistent violator allegation (R., pp.397-98).
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The matter proceeded to trial. (R., p.922.) The trial ended in a mistrial
when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. (R., p.922.) The trial
was reset, and the case proceeded to a second trial. At that second trial the jury
found Rossignol guilty on all counts, including the persistent violator charge. (R.,
pp.1230-31.) Rossignol was sentenced to forty years with thirty years fixed on
each of the four counts to run concurrent. (R., pp.1318-19.)
Rossignol filed a timely appeal. (R., p.1325.)

!
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ISSUES
Rossignol states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the court erred when it gave an erroneous reasonable
doubt instruction?

2.

Whether the court erred by admitting evidence of Mr. Rossignol's
flight?

3.

Whether the court erred when it admitted evidence of adult
pornography and incest stories found on Mr. Rossignol's computer?

4.

Whether Mr. Rossignol was deprived of due process when the
court admitted evidence that it had earlier ruled inadmissible and
the defense relied on the pre-trial ruling?

5.

Whether the court erred when it held that the child-related
communications exception to the psychologist-patient privilege did
not apply in this case and so prohibited examination of the victim's
psychologist?

6.

Whether the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal?

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Rossignol failed to show error in the jury instruction defining
reasonable doubt?

2.

Did the district court properly exercise its discretion when it admitted
evidence that Rossignol missed hearing dates and fled the jurisdiction
prior to trial?

3.

Did the district court properly exercise its discretion when it admitted two
one page exhibits containing pornographic images corroborating the
testimony of S.R. and three stories of father/daughter incest were not
propensity evidence but evidence of Rossignol's intent and motive to
engage in sexual relations with his daughter?

4.

Did the district court correctly determine that there was no inconsistency
between its pretrial and trial ruling on the admissibility of the transcript
from the interview conducted by Detective Lehmbecker and,
consequently, that Rossignol was not denied due process?

5.

Has Rossignol failed to show either that the district court erred in not
permitting him to cross-examine at the competency hearing, S.R.'s
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psychologist regarding S.R.'s treatment, or that Rossignol was prejudiced
by the court's determination?
6.

Has Rossignol failed to show any error, much less two or more errors that
would make the doctrine of cumulative error applicable to this case?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Rossignol Has Failed To Show The District Court's Reasonable Doubt Instruction
Was Erroneous
A.

Introduction
Rossignol argues the district court's reasonable doubt instruction was

erroneous, claiming it "misled and confused the jury since it cobbled together
various statements of the law and also left out a vital concept regarding the
burden of proof which had the effect of lessening the state's burden."
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

Rossignol's jury instruction claim fails because the

court's instruction correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt exactly as
provided in the model instruction and because the instruction was not misleading
and did not diminish the state's burden of proof.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 712, 85
P.3d 1109, 1111 (Ct. App. 2003). When reviewing jury instructions, courts must
determine whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the
issues and state the law. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 273, 77 P.3d 956,
962 (2003).
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C.

Rossignol Has Failed To Show The Reasonable Doubt Instruction Given
By The District Court Contained A Constitutionally Defective Definition Of
Reasonable Doubt
When reviewing a "reasonable doubt" instruction, the Constitution does

not dictate that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the
state's burden of proof, so long as taken as a whole, the instructions correctly
convey the concept of reasonable doubt. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 273, 77 P .3d at
962.

Therefore, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error

unless the instructions, when taken as a whole, misled the jury or prejudiced a
party.

.lQ.,. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has also specifically noted that

reasonable doubt instructions, like the one given in this case, do not need to be
verbatim recitations of the relevant Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction in order to
survive a challenge on appeal. 1 _lQ.,_ at 274, 77 P.3d at 963 (citing State v. Harris,
136 Idaho 484, 485, 36 P.3d 836, 837 (Ct. App. 2001 )). However, it has been
recognized that "pattern ICJI instructions are presumptively correct."

State v.

Ruel, 141 Idaho 600,602,114 P.3d 158,160 (Ct. App. 2005).
The district court gave the following jury instruction explaining the
reasonable doubt standard:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. Thus,
although accused, the defendant begins this trial with a clean slate.
In addition the defendant has a constitutional right not to testify and
you are to draw absolutely no inferences against him/her if he/she
exercises his/her right to remain silent.

The state acknowledges and does not disagree with the Idaho Supreme Court's
efforts to encourage district courts to use the approved Idaho Criminal Jury
Instructions to avoid "unnecessary appeals and controversy." Sheahan, 139
Idaho at 275, 77 P.3d at 964; State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,577,602 P.2d 71,
75 (1979) (citing State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904,478 P.2d 284 (1970)).
1
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The State must prove all material elements of the offense charged
in the Information to be true beyond a reasonable doubt before the
defendant can be guilty. In order to help you in your duties as
jurors I am going to outline for you the elements of the crime for
which the defendant has been charged.
The State must prove that on unknown dates between January,
2005 and September, 2005 in Idaho that Mr. Rossignol did commit
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age as described
in three of the counts against him and that he sexually abused a
child as described in the remaining count.
It is not necessary for the State to establish every fact and
circumstance put in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is
necessary to sustain a conviction that the facts and circumstances
in evidence, when take together, establish beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the material elements of offense that I have outlined.
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible
doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending
on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It
is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
(Instruction No. 3; R., pp.1189-90.)

This instruction, Instruction No. 3,

incorporates language from ICJI 103, the model jury instruction, including a
verbatim recitation of the final paragraph that explicitly defines "reasonable
doubt." ICJI 103 reads as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This
presumption places upon the state the burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a defendant,
although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate with no
If, after considering all the
evidence against the defendant.
evidence and my instructions on the law, you have a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not
guilty.
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible
doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending
on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It
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is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
Despite using almost the entire language of ICJI 103, including the entire portion
that defines reasonable doubt, Rossignol claims the court's instruction "misled
and confused the jury."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

The primary argument in

support of this claim is Rossignol's assertion that the jury was never informed
that the defendant never has "the burden or duty of calling any witness or
producing any evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) This criticism is unfounded
and is not a basis for finding error.
While Instruction No. 3 did not explicitly say that a defendant is not
required to call any witnesses or produce any evidence, the instruction made
clear that the burden of proof was on the state to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, every element of the crime with which Rossignol was charged: "The State
must prove all the material elements of the offense charged in the Information to
be true beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant can be found guilty."
(Instruction No. 3.) The court further instructed that "[i]t is not necessary for the
State to establish every fact and circumstance put in evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, but it is necessary to sustain a conviction that the facts and
circumstances in evidence, when taken together, establish beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the material elements of offense [sic] that I have outlined."
(Instruction No. 3.) Because this is incontrovertibly a fair and accurate statement
of the law, Instruction No. 3 cannot be considered inaccurate or misleading.
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Nor can Instruction No. 3 be considered incomplete or inadequate. The
state acknowledges the alternative instruction ICJI 103A contains the language
Rossignol claims should have been added. However, the standard instruction,
ICJI 103, does not include that language. Consequently, if the model instruction
does not include that language, and is presumed sufficient, it necessarily follows
that the mere absence of that language in Instruction No. 3 cannot be the basis
for claiming error. It is sufficient, as was undisputedly the case here, that the jury
is informed of the state's burden without referring to the fact that a defendant has
no burden to produce evidence.
Rossignol also claims Instruction No. 3 lowers the burden for the state.
Specifically, Rossignol claims the "comparison" language in the final paragraph
of Instruction No. 3 suggests that a defendant does in fact have a burden of
presenting evidence where no such requirement exists. The "compare" language
used by the court comes directly from ICJI 103: "It is the state of the case which,
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge."
The instruction to the jury to compare and consider all the evidence
presented does not suggest that Rossignol has a burden to produce evidence. It
merely instructs juries to consider the evidence that has been presented in
determining whether the state has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nothing in that paragraph suggests that a criminal defendant has to present
evidence or that the state is excused of its burden of proving the defendant's guilt
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beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, because this language comes from the

model instruction it is presumed to be correct. See Ruel, 141 Idaho at 602, 114
P.3d at 160. Rossignol has not met his burden of overcoming this presumption.

fl.

Rossignol Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Admitting Evidence Of Flight At Trial
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Rossignol's motion in limine to exclude evidence

of flight at trial, ruling that the evidence was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial.
On appeal, Rossignol argues the evidence of flight should have been excluded
because the evidence was not relevant and because it was unfairly prejudicial.
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) The basis for his argument in support of exclusion is
that there were additional charges, claims of perjury in the child protection case,
which were also pending against him. (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Rossignol claims
that because there "was clearly an additional reason or reasons for the flight" that
evidence was prejudicial and irrelevant. (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) This argument
has no merit. A review of the record shows that evidence of Rossignol's flight
was relevant to the accusations that he sexually abused his daughter.
Furthermore, there is also no support in the record for Rossignol's claim that the
admission of that evidence unfairly prejudiced him.

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate courts review de nova the trial court's determination of whether

evidence is relevant; however, they review all other evidentiary rulings for an
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abuse of discretion. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 766, 864 P.2d 596,
604 (1993). Thus, the trial court's determination that the probative value of the
"flight" evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. Moore, 131
Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998).

C.

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Determining The
Evidence Of Flight Was Relevant And Not Unfairly Preiudicial

In determining whether to admit evidence which is probative on the issue
of flight to avoid prosecution, a trial court must conduct a two-part analysis. State
v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). "First, the judge must
determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E: 401, and second, the judge
must determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."

&

(citing State v. Friedley. 122

Idaho 321, 834 P.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1992)).
At the hearing on Rossignol's motion in limine, the court was advised that
the state intended to present testimony that Rossignol missed a hearing and fled
the jurisdiction prior to trial. After Rossignol was arraigned on the lewd conduct
and child abuse charges he posted bond and was released on his own
recognizance. (R., p.84.) After Rossignol was charged with additional crimes -i

i
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'

giving perjured testimony in the child protection case -- the state filed a motion to
increase bond was filed and the court ordered Mr. Rossignol to appear.

(R.,

pp.158-59.) Rossignol failed to appear at that hearing. (R., p.292.) In response
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to Rossignol's failure to appear, the judge vacated the trial date and issued a
bench warrant. (R., pp.959-60.)
Rossignol argued to the district court that his flight was not evidence of
guilt because he did not flee at the first opportunity and appeared at many
hearings concerning the child protection proceedings.

(R., p.587),

He also

claimed that the circumstances surrounding his departure from the jurisdiction do
not clearly point to one particular reason and that he could not explain his flight
without referring to the perjury charge and this reference would be more
prejudicial than probative. (R., p.959)

The district court rejected Rossignol's

arguments and concluded that the flight was probative evidence of Rossignol's
guilt:
Mr. Rossignol fled from the state while very serious charges
were pending against him and a trial date was quickly approaching.
The maximum penally for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor
is life in prison. The maximum penalty for perjury is fourteen years.
The new allegations were directly related to the Child Protection Act
proceedings which arose out of the charges al issue here. It is
objectively unreasonable to conclude that the perjury charges, as a
discreet event, rather than the convergence of events relating to the
child sex abuse charges, gave rise to Mr. Rossignol's flight.

(R., p.959.) The district court also concluded that the relevant evidence was not
"unfairly prejudicial" and concluded that the evidence of Rossignol's flight was
admissible. (R., p.959.)
Rossignol makes the same arguments on appeal that he made to the
district court below.

Rossignol has failed to show, however, that the district

court's determination that evidence of Rossignol's flight was relevant was
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incorrect or that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded the
probative nature of the evidence outweighed the potential of unfair prejudice.
1.

Evidence Of Rossignol's Flight Was Relevant To Whether He
Engaged In Lewd And Lascivious Conduct And Sexually Abused
His Daughter

Rossignol has failed to show error in the district court's determination that
evidence of Rossignol's flight was relevant. Rossignol fled the jurisdiction as his
trial was quickly approaching and just before bail was likely to be increased.
Rossignol's flight came, therefore, just before his freedom was likely to be
curtailed and just before he was to be adjudicated by a jury on charges that
carried the potential for life imprisonment. Furthermore, as noted by the district
court, the child protection proceeding and perjury charges were all directly
connected to the child abuse and lewd and lascivious charges. Consequently,
evidence of Rossignol's flight was relevant to whether he engaged in lewd and
lascivious conduct and sexually abused his daughter -- the claims at issue in this
case -- as well as in the child protective case. As such, the district court properly
determined that evidence of Rossignol's flight was probative of his guilt.
2.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Determined
That The Probabitive Value Of The Flight Evidence Was Not
Outweighed By Any Unfair Prejudice

The district court properly exercised its discretion when it concluded the
probative value of the flight evidence was not outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Rossignol claims the "evidence of flight should not have been admitted due to the
unfair prejudice of not being able to explain all the possible motives for the flight
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without admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence."

(Appellant's Brief, p.22.)

Rossignol claims this "otherwise inadmissible evidence" was evidence regarding
Rossignol's perjury in the related child protection case. However, Rossignol has
failed to articulate what this evidence, unrelated to the sex abuse case, might
have been. Because the perjury charges flowed from and were directly related to
the charges of lewd conduct and sexual abuse of his daughter, there was no
reason for fleeing the perjury charge that was not related to the child abuse case.
Significantly, because Rossignol has failed to articulate what those unrelated
reasons for fleeing might have been, he has failed to meet his burden of showing
an abuse of discretion by the district court.

111.
Rossignol Has Failed To Show The Court Erred When It Admitted The
Pornography And Incest Stories Found On Rossignol's Computer
A.

Introduction
At trial, the court permitted the state to introduce two on page exhibits

containing five pornographic images (Exhibits 10 and 11) and three stories of
father/daughter incest (Exhibits 7, 8, and 9) found on Rossignol's computer.
Rossignol argues the two exhibits were not relevant and unfairly prejudicial.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26.) Rossignol also claims the stories of father/daughter
incest were impermissible under I.RE. 404 and I.RE. 403. (Appellant's Brief,
i

pp.25-26.) Rossignol's arguments are without merit. The selected pornographic
images were relevant to corroborate Rossignol's daughter's statements that her
father showed her pornographic images on his computer and then engaged in
similar sexual acts with her. Additionally, the stories of incest did not constitute
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impermissible propensity evidence but were relevant to show Rossignol's intent,
motive, and plan to engage in sexual acts with his daughter and were not
substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice.

8.

Standard Of Review
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de nova, but other questions of

admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v.

Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130
Idaho 630,632,945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997).
This same appellate standard of review applies to evidence that is
admitted pursuant to I.RE. 404(b). The district court's relevancy ruling is subject
to free review on appeal, but the district court's ruling that the probative value of
the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is reviewed
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Labelle, 126 Idaho 564, 887 P.2d 1071
(1995).

C.

The Pornography Found On Rossignol's Computer Was Relevant To
Corroborate Rossignol's Daughter's Testimony And Was Not Unfairly
Prejudicial
Prior to trial, Rossignol filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude "[a]ny

pornographic or sexual images found on any computer seized from the Rossignol
home."

(R., p.938.)

Rossignol claimed the pornography should be excluded

because the images were not corrobative of S.R.'s testimony and because the
images were highly prejudicial. (R., pp.945-46.) The district court rejected this
argument, incorporating the reasons articulated in its previous ruling before the
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first trial. (R., p.1108.) There, the court reasoned that the pictures found on the
computer were corroborative because the pornography admitted was identified
as being saved by Rossignol to his computer and because the pornography
matched the testimony of the victim -- that her father had shown her pornography
that involved "vaginal touching, oral sex and other forms of touching."

(R.,

p.964.) On appeal, Rossignol claims the court abused its discretion by admitting
the pornographic images because the victim failed to identify a "particular picture
as something which she had seen" and, "that, at most, the court should have
permitted evidence describing the pornography found without admitting the
actual pictures." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Rossignol's claims lack merit and do
not show that the pornography was irrelevant or that the district court abused its
discretion in concluding that the pornography was admissible because it
corroborated the victim's testimony.
The record shows that Rossignol's daughter made statements that the
images her father showed her on his computer were similar to the sex acts that
he forced her to engage in:
Q.

How old were you when your dad was doing this to you?

A.

Seven. Seven and six.

Q.

Okay. The pictures that he was showing you on the
computer were they like what he was doing to you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In what way?

A.

A lot of ways that I just said. Like -- like sucking the dick -sucking his dick, that's one picture.
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(Tr., p.257, Ls.1-7.) Indeed, a review of the pornographic images admitted into
evidence at trial shows that they depict the very sex acts that Rossignol engaged
in with his seven-old-daughter, including fondling her breasts, oral to genital
contact, and manual to genital contact.

(See State's Exhibit's 10 and 11;

compare Tr., p.250, L.2 - p.256, L.13; p.795, L.13 - p.807, L.18; p.993, L.2 p.994, L.4.)

Consequently, the specific images found on Rossignol's computer

and admitted into evidence are probative because they show that Rossignol's
daughter was telling the truth about the existence of pornography on the
computer and that pornographic images consistent with the sex acts her father
engaged in with her existed on Rosssignol's computer. This evidence is relevant
because it corroborated the statements the victim gave during the investigation
and at trial.
Furthermore, the pornography was also an integral part of the abuse itself
and, therefore, directly related to the crime. Prior to trial, the victim specifically
testified that Rossignol repeatedly showed her pornography as part of her abuse
and in preparation for sex acts:
Q.

Okay. Can you tell me what he did when he sexually
abused you?

A.

The third time he showed me pictures on the computer.

Q.

What kind of pictures did he show you?

A.

Like with a man and a woman and some with a man naked,
some were with a woman and some with the man and
woman naked.

Q.

And what was happening in the pictures?
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A.

Well, they were sexually abusing. Well, the woman was
either sexually abusing the man or the man was either
sexually abusing the woman.

Q.

Where were the pictures at?

A.

On his -- well, in his office.

Q.

Okay. What was he using to show you the pictures?

A.

The computer with the little mouse.

Q.

Okay. How many pictures did he show you?

A.

I don't know maybe 13, 14.

Q.

So he showed you more than one picture?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

How many times did he show you the pictures?

A.

Five, six, seven.

Q.

When he was showing you the pictures where was he at?

A.

He was in the office.

Q.

Where were you at?

A.

I was sitting in the office.

Q.

Where were you sitting in the office?

A.

On his chair.

Q.

Was it the same chair your dad was sitting in?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So were you sitting next to him or were you sitting on his
lap?

A.

On his lap.
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Q.

What was he wearing?

A.

The first time he had clothes on. The second time he didn't.

(Tr., p.245, L.25 - p.248, L.7.)
At trial, S.R. provided similar testimony linking the abuse

to the viewing of

pornography on Rossignol's computer:
Q.

Did he do anything else with you that same night that he
touched your penis [the young child referred to her vagina as
her penis]?

A.

Well, in the morning he took me to the -- to his computer and
showed me maybe ladies, maybe teenagers naked together.

Q.

I'm sorry, I missed part of that. Could you re-say that?

A.

Maybe ladies, maybe teenagers naked together on his
computer.

0.

Okay. How did you get into the place where he showed you
the pictures?

A.

I walked.

Q.

Where were you at when he first came --

A.

My bedroom.

Q.

What were you doing?

A.

Sleeping.

0.

So did he wake you up?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And how did he show you the pictures? Can you describe
what happened?

A.

He like typed them up.
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Q.

Okay, and where were you at in the office?

A.

I was with his computer.

(Tr., p.799, L.12-p.800, L.11.)
Thus, in addition to corroborating the victim's testimony regarding the
pornography that was shown to her on her father's computer, the images also
corroborated the victim's testimony that the pornography, viewed on Rossignol's
computer, was part of her systematic abuse.
Because the images provided strong corroboration for the victim's
testimony, the pornographic images were highly probative and the district court

'

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative nature was not
outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice. See lz&., State v. Rood, 848
P.2d 128, 131 (Or. App. 1993) (concluding trial court properly admitted graphic
pornographic video where victim claimed the defendant played the video when
he was abused and because, although prejudicial, the court concluded that the
video was highly probative in that it confirmed aspecb of the victim's account of
the crime). Here, the porngraphic images established the victim's testimony as
credible and, as such, was highly probative.

Given the probative nature of

evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the
probative value of the pornography, limited to just two exhibits, was not
outweighed by any unfair prejudice.
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D.

The Incest Stories Found On Rossignol's Computer Were Admissible As
I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence To Show Rossignol's Intent And Motive To Have A
Sexual Relationship With His Daughter
Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of

other "crimes, wrongs, or acts" is generally inadmissible to prove the character of
a person or that the person acted in conformity with that character. I.R.E. 404(b).
Such evidence is admissible, however, to prove matters other than propensity.
I.R.E. 404(b). Such permissible purposes include, proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178,845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v.
Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992); State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743,
819 P.2d 1143 (1991).
Here, Rossignol claims the district court erred because, he contends, the
stories of incest found on his computer were admitted into evidence "to show that
Mr. Rossignol had a propensity to commit incest."

(Appellant's Brief, p.28.)

Alternatively, Rossignol claims that even if the stories were relevant for a
purpose other than propensity, the district court nevertheless erred in admitting
them because, he argues, they were unfairly prejudicial and the jury did not need
to see the actual stories but only needed to be informed that the stories of incest
were found on his computer. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.)
Rossignol's claims fail.

It is clear the incest stories -- stories about a

father having sex with his daughter -- were relevant for a permissible purpose.
The fact that Rossignol downloaded to his computer fantasy stories of a father
having sex with his daughter is relevant to establishing Rossignol's sexual intent
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and motives toward his daughter. See, !Uh, United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d
935, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining why possession of child sex stories is
evidence of intent to have sex with underage girl). Rossignol's possession of the
stories corroborated the victim's testimony that her father had sexual relations
with her.

Consequently, the district court properly concluded that the stories

were relevant for a purpose other than to show propensity.
Rossignol's assertion that the court should have precluded the state from
introducing the actual stories is without merit. It was the detail of the stories that
made them relevant to the present case and that provided corroboration for the
victim's testimony. Consequently, although graphic and prejudicial (in the sense
that it tended to establish Rossignol's guilt, the detail was directly related to the
probative value of stories in determining Rossignol's intent and motive.
Accordingly, admission of this detail was not unfairly prejudicial and the
determination by the district court was not an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (concluding that evidence
is not unfairly prejudicial merely because it is detrimental to a party's case).
IV.
Rossignol Has Failed To Show He Was Deprived Of Due Process When The
Court Admitted Detective Lehmbecker's Interview Of The Victim

A.

Introduction
Prior to the first trial the district court ruled the victim's prior consistent

statements to Clara Hill (mentor), Elizabeth Heidelberger (school counselor),
Detective Margaret Lehmbecker, and Health and Welfare investigator Rholda
Schulz (following S.R.'s disclosure to Ms. Hill) would be admitted "only if the
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credibility or motive of S.R:s accusations are contested."

(R., p.966.) After

defense counsel opened the door by questioning the victim's credibility based on
her version of events at trial, the trial court permitted the prior consistent
testimony of S.R. to Detective Lehmbecker to be admitted. (R., pp. 1174-75.)
Prior to the second trial, the district court provided a different ruling. The
district court, pursuant to motion, ruled that S.R.'s statements to Ms. Hill "meet
the standards of IRE 803(24) [and were admissible]" but that "S.R.'s accounts to
Ms. Heidelberger, Ms. Schultz and Detective Lembecker are simply repetitive
accounts of the same testimony expected of S.R. at trial" and, consequently, that
those accounts "are cumulative hearsay without the same inherent indicia of
reliability on balance and as such should not be admitted." (R., p.1115.)
During trial, the defense did not attack the inconsistencies in S.R.'s
statements regarding the abuse but rather suggested that S.R. fabricated her
story as evidenced by her use of the words "massage" and "hole" -- terms that
defense claimed came from her experiences in Wyoming before she moved in
with her father. To rebut that claim, the state sought to admit S.R.'s interview
with Detective Lehmbecker during which S.R. used a more extensive vocabulary
to describe her abuse.

(Tr., p.1535, L.25 - p.18.)

In response, Rossignol's

counsel admitted that this was the defense strategy but claimed that the
statements to Detective Lehmbecker were still hearsay and not admissible:
The word massage, yes, we have pointed out that is a word that
has repeatedly appeared in her statements about what her father
did to her and that it also was from Chrisandra [her sister in
Wyoming]. And we are arguing that that was picked up by her. It's
not just a coincidence that the word her sister used is the word she
uses.
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(Tr., p.1537, L.23 - p.1538, L.4.) The district court rejected Rossignol's argument
and permitted the transcript of the interview to be admitted into evidence.
After the evidence was admitted Rossignol moved for reconsideration.
(Tr., p.1559, Ls.16-21.)

Rossignol claimed, as he does now on appeal

(Appellant's Brief, pp.34-38), that the decision to admit the transcript was a
violation of his due process rights under the Idaho and United States
Constitutions (Tr., p.1559, L.16 - p.1563, L.4).

Specifically, he claimed he

"should be able to present his case in reliance upon pretrial motions without
having the rules essentially changed at the end of the game for no reason that
was not apparent at the beginning of the trial" and that because the court's
decision to allow the transcript was inconsistent with its in limine motion ruling
there was "a question of due process of law." (Tr., p.1560, Ls.17-22; see also
Appellant's Brief, p.34.)
The district court rejected Rossignol's motion. The court concluded there
was no inconsistency and, therefore, no due process violation:
Well, first of all, I don't think it's inconsistent with my in-limine
rulings.
The prior inconsistent statements were kept out of
substantive evidence.
The last trial they were admitted as
substantive evidence of proof of the matter, the fact of matter of the
fact [sic) for which is it [sic) offered. That is not the reason that I let
it in this time. It was let in -- the State is entitled to rebut your
defense, and your defense has been and consistently has been
that she learned about all of this in Wyoming. She couldn't have
learned of it at her home with Donald Rossignol. I think the State is
entitled to know that she was familiar with terms and experiences
that transcend what the evidence is that occurred in Wyoming.
They are entitled to rebut. I don't think it's inconsistent at all. I
think it's perfectly consistent. One is offered for the proof of the
matter asserted, and the other is not submitted for that but rather
what her knowledge was containing certain terms and descriptions.
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So, I don't agree with you. I mean, the Appellate Court may. You
are entitled to call [S.R.]. I told that you [sic] from the beginning.
You can call her back. I would have her called back. If you want to
do that, you may. I don't think the dynamic has changed at all. If
you want to examine her about how much she knew in Wyoming
and how much she didn't know you're entitled to ask that. That's
your defense. I'm not going to impede your ability to do that in any
respect. But I'm comfortable with my ruling.
(Tr., p.1563, l.5- p.1564, L.9.) Consistent with its ruling, the trial court submitted
a limiting instruction to the jury admonishing them that they could only consider
the transcript for the purpose of determining S.R.'s sexual vocabulary:
I have admitted State's Exhibit 25A, a partial transcript of an
interview of [S.R.] by Det. Lehmbecker, for only one purpose. I
have admitted it as evidence of the words and phrases [S.R.] used
to describe sexual parts of the body and actions involving those
parts of the body. You may not consider this evidence for any other
purpose.
This means you may not use State's Exhibit 25A as
evidence that any of the events [S.R.] described in it actually
happened.
(R., p.1209.)
Rossignol has failed to show how the district court's ruling or reasoning
was incorrect. The court's pretrial ruling was not inconsistent with its trial ruling
and there was no due process violation.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where a defendant claims that his or her right to due process was

violated, appellate courts defer to the trial court's findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct.
App. 2001 ).

However, appellate courts freely review the application of

constitutional principles to those facts found. jg,_
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C.

Rossignol Has Failed To Show Any Inconsistency Between The Trial
Court's In Limine Ruling And Its Determination To Admit Rebuttal
Evidence
The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a fair trial

through the Due Process Clauses. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
U.S. 140, 146 (2006). Here, Rossignol claims he was denied his right to a fair
trial because he claims the court changed its pre-trial ruling regarding the
admissibility of evidence "without a change in circumstance." (Appellant's Brief,
p.34.)

Rossignol has failed to show how the district court's ruling was in error,

much less that the error violated his due · process rights.

Contrary to his

assertions, there was no inconsistency in the district court's rulings. As correctly
stated by the district court in its ruling, the motion in limine excluded the
transcript's admission on a substantive basis as a prior consistent statement.
This determination was unrelated to and not inconsistent with the court's
subsequent determination to admit the transcript, not for the truth of the matter
asserted, but to show knowledge of particular words to rebut a particular defense
presented by Rossignol. Because there was no inconsistency Rossignol's claim
of due process violation fails.
Additionally, contrary to Rossignol's claims, the court's rulings did not alter
his defense or prevent him from confronting S.R. as a witness. (Appellant's Brief,
p.36.)

Rossignol claims he had "forgone impeachment of S.R. so that the

interview would not be admitted" and that this had effectively precluded him from
confronting S.R. as a witness. As the trial court's ruling makes clear, Rossignol
was free to calf S.R. back to the stand to question her: "I told that you [sic) from
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the beginning. You can call her back. I would have her called back. If you want
to do that, you may. I don't think the dynamic has changed at all." (Tr., p.1564,
Ls.1-9.) Thus, there were no inconsistencies in the court's rulings and the district
court's ruling did not substantively affect Rossignol's ability to make his defense.
Rossignol has failed to show a violation of his due process rights.

V.
Rossignol Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred When It Ruled That
Rossignol Could Not Examine The Treating Pyschologist Regarding S.R.'s
Treatment
A.

Introduction
At S.R.'s competency hearing, the district court precluded Rossignol from

examining Dr. Von Moltke, S.R.'s current psychologist, regarding "any treatment
that she's given [to S.R.] or any conclusions she's drawn that she thinks are
necessary for that treatment" as well as any "communications" related to the
treatment of S.R. (Tr., p.12, Ls.3-8; p.13, L.5 - p.14, L.12.) The court allowed
the parties to question the therapist regarding her diagnosis that S.R. had
reactive attachment disorder and other disorders and how that would affect her
competency at trial: "I will only allow it in terms of her diagnosis and the extent to
which that would affect her competency.

We're here to determine [S.R.]'s

competency. We're not here to determine whether her treatment is good or bad
or what information has been received by a treatment provided in order to
provide that treatment. I want to keep the focus on competency, okay." (Tr.,
p.14, Ls.18-25.) In support of this determination, the district court discussed the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, I.R.E. 503.
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(Tr., p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.22.)

Rossignol asserted that the privilege was not applicable because, here, the
patient was a child and I.R.E. 503(d)(4) excepts child patients from being able to
use the privilege. (Tr., p.9, Ls.7-25.) The court rejected Rossignol's claim that
no privilege existed because the patient was a child. The court concluded that
the child related communications exception referenced in I.R.E. 503(d)(4) related

to identification of abuse not the subsequent treatment for abuse where the
condition of the child was already known. (Tr., p.11, L.3- p.10, L.11.)
Rossignol claims this determination was in error. He argues, as he did at
the competency hearing, that I.R.E. 503(d)(4) should be interpreted as
eliminating the psychotherapist-patient privilege where the patient is a child and
where all the communications to the therapist relate to the child.
Brief, pp.38-41.)

Rossignol's claim is without merit.

(Appellant's

The language of I.R.E.

503(d)(4) is not a blanket exception but applies where the communication
between therapist and patient involves communications that suggests the welfare
of the child is at risk and not where the abuse is known and the therapist is
providing treatment for that abuse. Additionally, Rossignol's broad interpretation
is inconsistent with a child-patient's constitutionally protected privacy interest in
keeping their treatment private.

Furthermore, even if the court erred in its

determination regarding the privilege, S.R. has failed to show any harm resulting
from that determination. There was no harm because S.R. was determined to be
competent and because she ultimately testified at trial.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Interpretation of the rules of evidence is a matter of law over which the

appellate courts exercise free review. See State v. Homolka, 131 Idaho 172, 953
P.2d 612, 613 (1998) (court exercises free review of questions of law); Atkinson
v. State, 131 Idaho 222,953 P.2d 662,664 (Ct. App. 1998) (same).
C.

f.R.E. 503(d)(4l Does Not Eliminate The Psychotherapist Privilege Where
The Child Is The Patient
1.R.E. 503(b)(2) provides that:
A patient has a privilege in a criminal action to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of
the patient's mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or
drug addiction, among the patient, the patient's psychotherapist,
and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment
under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of
the patient's family.

Rossignol claims this privilege did not apply at S.R.'s competency hearing
because I.R.E. 503(d)(4) states that: "There is no privilege under this rule in

a

criminal or civil action or proceeding as to a communication relevant to an issue
concerning the physical, mental or emotional condition of or injury to a child, or
concerning the welfare of a child including but not limited to the abuse,
abandonment, or neglect of a child." Rossignol claims S.R.'s communications
with her therapist necessarily related to her condition and, because she is a child,
no privilege exists.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.40-41.) Rossignol's interpretation is

flawed and constitutionally suspect.
A plain reading of the rule shows the privilege does not apply when the
communication pertains to the "condition" or "injury" of a child. For this reason,
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the court permitted S.R.'s therapist to be questioned regarding S.R.'s condition of
reactive attachment disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression.
(Tr., p.91, L.19 - p.93, L.12.) However, the court, consistent with the rule and the
exception precluded the therapist from testifying about post-identification
treatment -- treatment and information that the child would have an interest in
keeping confidential. Indeed, where the condition and/or injury of the child is
known, there is nothing that prevents the court from excluding testimony
regarding treatment because that treatment is not relevant to the condition of the
child as it relates to the criminal action.
Although no court has addressed the novel construction asserted by
Rossignol, the Idaho Supreme Court has suggested that the purpose of the
exception is to protect children where the confidential communication suggests
that a child is being abused or neglected. In State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 119,
29 P.3d 949, 955 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court was willing to pierce the
privilege veil where an adult patient "made any communication to his
psychologist or counselor relevant to an issue concerning the allegation of sexual
abuse ... " That is simply not the case here. The communications here concern
the treatment of abuse not the claim of abuse. Furthermore, there is no Idaho
case and there appears to be no other case in any other jurisdiction where a
criminal defendant was permitted to use the exception in an offensive manner
after the abuse is known -- to essentially gather information regarding the
treatment of an abused child, ignoring any privacy interest the child may have
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with regard to that treatment.

In short, there is no authority to support the

expansive interpretation suggested by Rossignol.
In People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1983), the California Supreme
Court articulated why the psychotherapist-patient privilege must be narrowly
construed.

The court reasoned that an aspect of the psychotherapist-patient

privilege incorporated an individual's right to privacy under the California and
federal constitutions.

&

at 742 (citing California Constitution and California case

law identifying federal privacy right articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)). The court recognized that this privacy interest on the part of a
patient was not absolute but could be broached by a "compelling state interest."
jg_,_ "To determine whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege embraced by the

right to privacy has impermissibly been violated, we begin by considering the
state's competing interest. Here, that interest is the detection and prevention of
child abuse ...." jg_,_ at 743.

Consequently, in California, the psychotherapist-

patient privilege is construed narrowly taking into account the reason for
breaching the privacy interest of the client -- protecting the child.
Here, it is clear that the purpose of the exception contained in I.R.E.
503( d)( 4) is to protect a similar state interest.

The exception illustrates as

examples of communication that can be disclosed "the abuse, abandonment or
neglect of a child."

I.R.E. 503(d)(4).

However, where this is the case, a

compelling government interest clearly exists, and piercing the privilege is
consistent with constitutional authority. Where, as here, the exception is being
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read to exclude any privacy interest of the child, the interpretation is inviolate of
the child's privacy interest and cannot pass constitutional muster.
Accordingly, Rossignol's claim that the district court erred in not adopting
his expansive interpretation of I.RE. 503(d)(4), thereby preventing the
examination of Dr. Von Moltke on issues relating to S.R.'s treatment at her
competency hearing, is unpersuasive.
D.

Any Error Regarding The Taking Of Evidence At The Competency
Hearing Was Harmless Because The Court Ruled In Favor Of Rossignol
And Found S.R. Competent To Testify
Even if the district court erred in not allowing Rossignol to examine Dr.

Von Moltke on issues relating to S.R.'s treatment at her competency hearing, that
error is harmless.

It is incontrovertible that the district court, regardless of its

determination relating to Dr. Von Moltke, found in favor of Rossignol and
concluded that S.R. was competent to testify.

(Tr., p.112, L.25 - p.113, L.2.)

Error is harmless if the appellate court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt,
,!

that there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the
conviction. State v. Cordova, 137 Idaho 635, 642, 51 P.3d 449, 456 (Ct. App.
2002).

Here, the error pertained to Rossignol's attempt to gather information

regarding S.R.'s condition to testify. Because the district court found in favor of
Rossignol and because S.R. testified, there is no basis for Rossignol to claim
prejudice.

34

VI.
Rossignol Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To
This Case
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v.
/

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).

one error. State v.

Rossignol has failed to

show that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is
inapplicable to this case. See, §.&, LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937
P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v.
Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella,
135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors
deemed harmless).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Rossignol's convictions.
DATED this 14th day of October, 2008.
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